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The Advantages of Utilizing the WTO as a Global Forum for
Environmental Regulation
Christopher J. Kula*
Introduction
Trade regulation and liberalization have frequently been depicted as a contrast to
environmental concerns.' The emphasis on enforcement of international environmental
matters is a relatively recent phenomenon. This is due to an increasing amount of
scientific evidence of the gravity of environmental harm caused by human development.
Many environmental organizations and developing countries exhibit active concern over
this issue. However, there is a growing realization of the importance of having integrated
global standards, across many fields, in order to balance market interests and the
environment. 2 The inherent conflict between trade and the environment must be resolved
in the same forum, rather than under the parallel approach of regulating international
trade under the WTO and environmental concerns under the various international treaties
that exist. Large-scale compliance in the area of international environmental regulation
could be obtained under the World Trade Organization (WTO) framework via the more
binding Dispute Settlement Understanding, which has become effective in securing
compliance among nations participating in international trade. The protection of the
global commons can no longer be successfully approached under traditional doctrines of
exclusive national sovereignty and jurisdiction.
At issue is whether the WTO would be an efficient method of enforcement of
international environmental regulations, as opposed to current standards administered by
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) or enforcement mechanisms
available under other international bodies. In order to gain some understanding of
International Environmental regulation and its relation to trade, it is necessary to delve
into a brief history.
GATT 1947
Established in 1947, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)3
provides a framework of rules for international trade among over 100 member nations.
The global economic community generally regarded it as a failed attempt to create a
"The author is a student at Hofstra University School of Law, Hempstead, New York, graduating in 2003.
Thomas Cottier, The WTO and EnvironmentalLaw: Some Issues and Ideas, at
http://www.itd.org/issues/essay l.html
2Id.
3 U.S. Office of Technology Assessment, Trade and the Environment: Conflicts and opportunities(1992)
(Report no. OTA-BP-ITE-94), at http://www.ciesin.org/docs/008-067/chpt2.html

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2002

1

Journal of International Business and Law, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [2002], Art. 4

fully-fledged international trade agency. A major problem with GATT is that it lacked
any sound legal binding power, as it was never ratified in member's parliaments and
enforcement under the Agreement was ad hoc and provisional by nature.4 The modes of
negotiating international agreements were less efficient, initially, but evolved over many
years, under the concept of multilateral "rounds".5 In terms of dispute settlement, one
nation could block the GATT Council's adoption of an adverse panel report. 6 Moreover,
the US could refuse to change its sovereign law to conform with GATT, in addition to
blocking the imposition of any retaliatory penalties proposed by the aggrieved country or
countries. 7 This largely rendered GATT to be considered an Agreement without any
teeth. To further the interests of the environment, GATT had created a working Group on
Environmental Measures and International Trade in 1971 to consider: (1) trade provisions
contained in multilateral environmental agreements; (2) Multilateral transparency; and
(3) the trade effects of new packaging and labeling requirements aimed at protecting the
environment. However, this group was rarely utilized, never having convened until
1991.
Early international environmental disputes were resolved pursuant to GATT panel
reports, which summarily addressed the issue and rendered a decision that carried
minimal weight. Because the concept of International Environmental Law had just begun
to develop, minimal precedent or case law had been established in this area. Disputes
arose mainly from the use of the GATT Article XX exception. One example is the 1991
Tuna-Dolphin proceeding which involved a GATT Article XX(b) exception, 9 which
allows a nation to adopt or enforce measures "necessary to protect human, animal, or
plant life & health", 10 thereby allowing the imposition of an economic ban of a foreign
nation's goods for environmental protection justifications. The ultimate goal in TunaDolphin was to prevent the loss of dolphin life due to capture in tuna nets. The US had
imposed a ban on tuna caught by the Mexican fleet because of their lack of compliance
with US Marine and Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) regulations mandating dolphinsafe nets. 1 The GATT dispute settlement panel found that the ban, under Article XX(b),
was inapplicable because GATT Article XI forbids extraterritorial imposition of US
regulations upon Mexico.' Such use was deemed a unilateral extension of US sovereign
standards on a developing nation. This begs the question of whether disputes of this

4 WTO Official Website,
5 See, supra note 1
6

The WTO and GATT-are they the same?, at http://www.wto.org

See, supra note 4.

7id.

See, supra note 3.
9 GATT/WTO Article XX, BISD 1/48-50 (May 1952).
10Id.
8

"The Tuna-Dolphins Case, 39d' Supp. BISD 155 (1993), United States' restriction on imports of tuna from
Mexico, GATT panel decision, also available at http://www.wto.org
12 Id.
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nature could be avoided if international standards of process and production (PPM) were
in place.
Multilateral Agreements Concerning the Environment
Multilateral environmental agreements (MEA's) and treaties became the
preeminent ways to garner cooperation across borders. This distinct area of international
environmental law began to emerge in the early 1970's. The seminal event was the 1972
Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment, where the fundamental principles of
international environmental law were articulated in the Stockholm Declaration. 13 The
Conference also served as the impetus for the United Nations Environmental Programme
(UNEP). Not long thereafter, international agreements concerning the environment began
to rise into prominence. 14 From the late 1980's onward, there was a marked increase in
the number of multilateral agreements and the subject matter of environmental
protection. 15 Biodiversity, ozone depletion, and global climate change are subjects, which
received and continue to receive significant attention. 16 However, the treaties only
addressed specific areas of environmental concern and generally lacked an overarching
enforcement mechanism of any substance. In addition, the potential lack of consistency
between GATT provisions and those contained in numerous multilateral environmental
agreements have raised issues of concern.1 7 The major MEA's that are prevalent in the
area of trade and the environment are the CITES treaty, Montreal Protocol, the Basel
Convention, and the Kyoto Protocol. These MEA's contained rudimentary, but
inadequate dispute resolution provisions to properly enforce environmental regulation in
today's world.
The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and
Flora (CITES) of 1973 was ratified by the US and concerned biodiversity, namely the
protection of wild flora and fauna in trade. Parties to the agreement managed to retain
much of their sovereignty, as it was recognized that the states could best protect the
species within their states. Dispute resolution under CITES consisted of negotiation,
arbitration, and if those options failed, resolution at the forthcoming conference of the
parties. CITES remains effective today, in dealing with the endangered species and trade.
Despite its success, the general attitude and issues on the international environmental
scene have changed and grown more complex since its entry into force.

13Andrew

L. Strauss, From Gattzillato the Green Giant: Winning the EnvironmentalBattlefor the Soul of
the World Trade Organization, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 769 (Fall, 1998).
14 Menu of Treaty Texts (Subject Index), at http:www.ciesin.org/pidb/texts-subject.html
15 Id.

16 Id.
17

See, supra note 3.
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The Montreal Protocol was negotiated under the framework of the Vienna
Convention of 1985, which first addressed ozone depletion concerns. At this stage, there
was a general awareness of the need for international cooperation and action. The Vienna
Convention outlined states' responsibilities for protecting human health and the
environment against the adverse effects of ozone depletion.' 8 The Montreal Protocol,
signed in 1987 and amended five times thus far, is a landmark international agreement
designed to protect the stratospheric ozone layer. Based on scientific evidence and
enforced by trade restrictions, it stipulates that the production and consumption of
to be phased out pursuant to separate timetables for
substances that deplete the ozone are
19
nations.
developing
and
developed
The Basel Convention, ratified by 135 member countries and entered into force in
1992, addressed the problems and challenges posed by hazardous waste as a result of the
tightening of environmental regulations in industrialized countries in the late 1980's. Its
goal was environmentally sound management (ESM), the aim of which is to protect
human health and the environment by minimizing hazardous waste production whenever
possible. The Basel Convention provisions permitted the parties to delegate compliance
in a more unilateral manner, without much elaboration as to proper mechanisms for so
doing. It enabled national governments to take appropriate measures to implement and
enforce its provisions, including trade measures to prevent or punish conduct in
contravention of the Convention.
The Kyoto Protocol was designed to reduce emissions of greenhouse gasses
(GHG's) in the effort to mitigate the global warming problem. 20 It is also one of the most
complicated environmental agreements ever adopted. However, the failure to gain
acceptance by crucial nations, particularly the U.S., has caused major problems in its
implementation because there is no incentive for international compliance where major
players do not have to abide by its mandates. Nevertheless, the Kyoto Protocol is a
historic landmark in international environmental law and policy and will inferably serve
as a framework for future agreements.
Rio Conference
In 1992, the United Nations Conference on Environmental Development
(UNCED) at Rio De Janeiro was the first meeting of a large contingency of nations
specifically dealing with pertinent global environmental issues and recognizing that a

18 The Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, at
http://www.ciesin.org/TG/PI/POLICY/montpro.html

19The Ozone Secretariat, Ozone Treaties, at http://www.unep.org/ozone/treaties.shtml
Suraje Dessai, Air and Atmosphere: The Fifth Conference of the Partiesto the UnitedNations

20

Framework Convention on Climate Change: An Advancement or Derailmentof the Process? 1999 COLO. J.
INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y

192 (1999).

100
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problem clearly existed. 2 1 This Conference was comprised of numerous proceedings all
focusing generally on sustained development, namely Agenda 21 (for the 2 1st Century)
and the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, the Framework Convention
on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Convention on Biological Diversity, the Convention
on Forest Principles, and NGO alternative Treaties. 22 Agenda 21, adopted by 118 nations
at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED),
answered the UN General Assembly's call for "increased national and international
efforts to promote sustainable and environmentally sound development in all
countries" .23 This comprehensive program of action was to be implemented by
Governments, developmental agencies, United Nations organizations and independent
24
sector groups in every area where human economic activity affects the environment.
UNCED recognized the need to reverse environmental degradation, the importance of
international cooperation, and the developmental priorities of developing countries. 25 In
particular, Agenda 21 proposals for international law focus on improving the legislative
capabilities of developing countries, assessing the efficacy of current international
agreements and setting priorities for the future. 6 It recognized that the participation of all
countries in global treaty-making is essential, in addition to promoting international
standards for environmental protection gradually, taking into account the different
situations and abilities of countries. 27 Now the focus started to turn towards broadening
and strengthening international mechanisms for settlement of disputes without
unnecessarily restricting international trade.
The Rio Conference had merely recognized the need for stronger enforcement
mechanisms. This was a significant step towards the development of such an
international enforcement mechanism. It had become evident that, under the current
system, there was a lack of sufficient authority to enforce standards internationally. In
February 1992, the GATT Secretariat released a trade and environment analysis put forth
for consideration by UNCED, offering several suggestions for making environmental
policy consistent with GATT.28 It suggests that "it is no longer possible for a country to
create an appropriate environmental policy entirely on its own." It called for multilateral
rules to guide countries environmental policies and also indicated that a dispute
settlement procedure is needed to back up the rules. However, the report stopped short of
suggesting a specific institution to undertake this function. One institution with the
Press Summary of Agenda 21, Department of Public Information, United Nations, DPI/1298 - October
1992 - 3M, at http://www.igc.apc.org/habitat/agenda21/index.html
22 Agenda 21 & Other UNCED Agreements, at http://www.igc.apc.org/habitat/agenda21/index.html
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Agenda 21, International Legal Instruments and Mechanisms, Section IV, Chapter 39, at
http://www.igc.apc.org/habitat/agenda21/index.html
27 Id.
28 See, supranote 3.
21
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potential to aid nations in this endeavor was the Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD).29 OECD is an international institution that developed guiding
principles concerning trade and the environment, in 1973.30 OECD's process has
involved both the trade agencies and the environmental agencies to a degree unmatched
by other international bodies. In fact, OECD principles were speculated as a basis for
amending GATT and for new institutional approaches to reconcile trade and environment
concerns. However, a major problem with the OECD was the minimal representation of
developing nations. Moreover, it had a limited capacity to set and enforce policy among
its members, which consist of 24 countries from the developed world, and the European
Commission (EC).
WTO
After seven and a half years, the Uruguay Round established the existence of the
World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1994, which was one of the greatest international
reforms since the Second World War. 3 ' The newly born WTO involved 125 "member"
countries, all of which were required to ratify the collective WTO Agreements. 32 It
amended and incorporated the GATT 1947 agreement into the new WTO agreements
while adding the new General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and Agreement
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). 33 The new dispute
settlement system provided for a more structured process with clearly defined stages in
the procedure and an emphasis on prompt resolution. 34 This was based on the idea that
the most harmonious way to settle disputes is through neutral procedure based on an
agreed legal foundation. As an international organization, the WTO has a sound legal
foundation due to its permanence and its clarity of function. It is a single organization,
with a single set of rules, and a single system for resolving trade disputes.
The WTO dispute settlement system is faster and more automatic than the old
GATT system. 35 Under the previous GATT procedure, rulings could only be adopted by
consensus, meaning that a single objection could block the ruling. 36 WTO panel decisions
were adopted automatically, and could only be blocked if there was consensus to reject a

Id.
30 Id.
31 The Uruguay Round, Trade Act of 1974, §151, 19 U.S.C.A. 2191, as amended, Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1988, §§1102-1103, 19U.S.C.A. §§2902-2903; Pub.L.No. 103-49, §1, 107 Stat.
239 (1993) (adding 19 U.S.C.A. 2902(e) (Special Provisions Regarding Uruguay Round Trade
Negotiations)), also availableat http://www.wto.org
32 Id.
33 WTO Official Website, What is the World Trade Organization?,at http://www.wto.org
34 WTO Official Website, TradingInto the Future: The Introduction to the WTO, at http://www.wto.org
35 Id.
36 Id.
29
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ruling. Despite such structure, it remains flexible in having consultation and mediation as
available remedies, thereby allowing the countries to come to solutions by themselves.
The dispute settlement system has exhibited the ability to evolve, in practice, to
the enhanced responsibilities it may face beyond the realm of trade liberalization. In
handling the EC ban on meat production which was supported by the use of natural and
synthetic hormones, the WTO dispute settlement system saw its first extensive scientific
evidence hearing. 37 In that case, the Panel held the EC's ban was illegal as there was no
concrete scientific evidence of health risks from the use of beef hormones. 38 It is not
unrealistic to foresee the WTO dispute settlement mechanism tackle similar hearings,
near
future.
the
in
concerns,
environmental
to
with
respect
Deficiencies in Current International Environmental Organizations and Treaties
As the world grows more interdependent, the lack of uniform cohesion and
enforceability of the multitude of separate means of environmental governance is more
evident. The emergence of global environmental problems such as ozone depletion and
global warming, and the growing sense that the world environment is ecologically
interconnected, has made the need for global environmental regulation increasingly
clear. 39 It is arguable whether environmental sovereignty can realistically be a defense for
nations with sub-par environmental policies and practices. One nation's pollution can,
and does, contribute to damage of the global commons. Under the current system, there
are too many overlapping or under-inclusive organizations and agreements, which fail to
provide a solid platform upon which the international environment can be governed. In
some cases, multiple treaties or organizations will cover the same environmental harm,
leaving confusion over which countries are complying with what treaty. This inherent
lack of transparency creates the incentive for problems with free rider nations. In other
cases, there are problems with the acceptance of treaties, such as the case with the Kyoto
Protocol.4 °
In order to ascertain what kind of international regime would be optimal, we must
first look at some of the deficiencies that exist today. It has become clear that the
relationship between the GATT/WTO rules and Multilateral Environmental Agreements
needs clarification. Most of the environmental problems that have been treated on the
international level have been dealt with in a segmented and uncoordinated manner.
Despite the great activity in drafting new international environmental treaties in recent
years, growth and development of environmental organizations has not been significantly
37 See, supra note 1.
38

Id.

39

Andrew L. Strauss, Externalities, Technology, and Sustainable Development: The Casefor Utilizing the
World Trade Organizationas a Forumfor Global EnvironmentalRegulation, 3 WID. L. SYMP. J. 309 (Fall,
1998).
40 See, supra note 20.
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furthered on an institutional context. 41 The problem with overlap has been exacerbated by
the independent nature that has characterized most MEA's, as the secretariats have failed
to collaborate and are located far from one another.42
Current Deficiencies under GATT
The current GATT/WTO system is a regime consisting of primarily "negative"
obligations in which states agree to refrain from taking actions that could impede market
access. 43 In the interest of trade liberalization, the GATT/WTO rules are designed to
encourage deregulated markets through the removal of national measures that serve as
barriers to trade. This includes non-tariff barriers such as environmental regulations that
restrict market access for beef and gasoline, to name two recent examples. This has led
some to criticize GATT as being "asymmetric" in terms of how it addresses
environmental regulation. 44 Namely, that it provides for assessments that a given nation's
environmental standard is, in some sense, too high and a burden on trade flows. However,
no comparable provision exists to allow a determination that an environmental standard is
too low and is burdening other countries with pollution externalities. Judgments such as
the latter are necessary to determine whether a nation is "free riding" by possibly
reducing its manufacture costs and obtaining an unfair trade advantage, rather than
participating in efforts to address trans-border environmental problems. The obvious end
goal here was to reduce or eliminate the free-rider problem and to maximize international
compliance.
Enforcement of a nation's environmental standards under GATT is accomplished
by circumventing the permissible scope of domestic regulation for goods in international
trade. Primarily, this is done via the Article XX(b) exception, as a means for justifying a
given nation's environmental measure.45 It mandates that a nation's environmental
standard or justification for restricting import of a foreign product is "necessary" and
does not "arbitrarily and unjustifiably" discriminate between countries where the same
conditions prevail, or restrict international trade.46 The other major provision of GATT is
the "National Treatment" Standard, or Article III. This allows countries to require that
foreign products conform to domestic regulations as long as such regulations treat foreign
Douglas J. Caldwell and David A. Wirth, Book Review: Esty,Greeningthe GA 7T: Trade, Environment,
and the Future,(Runge et. al.), FreerTrade, ProtectedEnvironment: Balancing Trade Liberalizationand
EnvironmentalInterests, (Cameron et. al. EDS.), Trade and the Environment: The Searchfor Balance,
41

Vogel; Trading Up: Consumers and EnvironmentalRegulation in a GlobalEconomy, 17 MICH. J.

INT'L L.

563 (Spring, 1996).
42 Id.
43 Id.

44See, supranote 13.
45 Id.
46Id.
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products no less favorably than "like products" of domestic origin. 7 Lastly, prohibitions
against so-called technical barriers to trade (TBT's) have also been mentioned in
reference to potential trade and environmental conflicts. 48 All of the above focus on
measures a national government can take to enforce its own environmental policies, the
greater emphasis being placed on the condition that trade is not restricted unnecessarily.
As the emphasis remains on promoting trade liberalization, as opposed to enforcement
and development of environmental policies of a more global nature, there is little freedom
for environmental standards to evolve commensurate with growing international
awareness and scientific evidence reinforcing such a need.
The GATT/WTO regime approaches sustainable development in the following
manner: deregulated markets promote trade, trade generates wealth, and wealthier
countries have more resources to deploy for realizing environmental protection.49 Such an
indirect approach to the environment cuts against the reality of large-scale compliance,
specifically for developing nations, as this approach is an inherently long-term solution
that is largely based on theory. Moreover, such a long time frame is unrealistic to address
the imminence of global environmental harm. To attempt to resolve the applicable
conflicts between trade and the environment, the salient issues must be addressed in
conjunction with one another, under an overarching organization. The reasoning should
follow that independent environmental rules, rather than trade rules favoring trade
liberalization alone, are required for effective environmental governance.
Overlapping Scope of Environmental Organizations and MEA's
A major source of conflict in the regulatory areas of trade and the environment is
due to the focus of GATT rules, which aim for freer trade, and the existent environmental
rules contained in the governing multilateral environmental agreements (MEA's), which
generally include measures that restrict trade or production. 50 The GATT, institutions or
organizations, and MEA's have come to significantly overlap and converge. In order gain
some clarity, the rules governing international environmental law must be addressed as
one concern. In the recent 1999 WTO report, the secretariat found that "increased trade
and economic integration reinforce51 the need for greater environmental cooperation on
global and trans-border problems."
Only one international organization has a mission that is exclusively
environmental, the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP). 52 Since its
47 Id.
48 Trade Policy and Global Environmental Change, at http://www.sedac.ciesin.orglentri.

See, Caldwell and Wirth, supranote 41.
50 See, Strauss, supranote 13.
51Steve Charnovitz, Current Development: World Trade and the Environment: A Review of the New
WTO
49

Report, 12 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 523 (2000).
52

Id.
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inception, UNEP has been very instrumental in garnering international environmental
cooperation. For example, UNEP was the driving force behind the 1987 Montreal
Protocol, it administered the CITES Convention and in forging the Convention on
Biological Diversity, it cooperated with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN
(FAO) in 1998 resulting in the Rotterdam Convention covering trade in hazardous
pesticides and chemicals. UNEP is also a driving force to engage private sector leaders in
a change of course towards sustainability. 3 Moreover, Governing Council was
established in 1975 for the purpose of promoting international cooperation in the field of
the environment. 54 Despite UNEP's important contributions to the field of international
environmental cooperation and its strong influence, its institutional existence is focused
largely on guidance and recommendation. There is a lack of emphasis on the enforcement
of its responsibilities, thereby limiting its functional structure.
Aside from UNEP, there are numerous other organizations that play important,
but distinct roles in global environmental regulation. The Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) has been instrumental as a forum for discussing
transboundary pollution and principles concerning the trade-environment nexus.55 The
U.N. Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) has been the vehicle for negotiating a
number of important agreements on traditional air pollution issues and in promoting
intergovernmental cooperation with regard to Europe's timber markets. 56 The UN
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) promotes the integration of trade,
environment and development, mainly concerning developing nations, and acts as a task
manager in this area for the UN Commission on Sustainable Development.5 7 The UN
Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), as mentioned above, has contributed to
control of pesticides at the international level.
No tangible focal point exists to effectuate the auspices of so many conventions
and organizations in a coherent and transparent manner. The result has been a lack of
coordination and a high degree of fragmentation among the numerous organizations and
MEA's. An example of all the areas and linkages that involve international
environmental governance include global climate change, ozone depletion, desertification
and land cover change, deforestation, conservation of biological diversity, transboundary
air pollution, oceans and their living resources, industry and the environment, and
population dynamics.5 8 Under each of these subjects, there exists numerous treaties or
agreements, which total over 150 different MEA's encompassing the area of international
environmental law. Given this, the problem of overlap and confusion becomes apparent.
53

UNEP Achievements, at http://www.unep.org/DOCUMENTS
UNEP Governing Bodies, Overview, at http://www.unep.org/DOCUMENTS
Id.
56
UNECE, Trade Division, Who We Are and What We Do, at http://www.unece.org/trade
57
UNTAD in Brief, Programmatic Focus, InternationalTrade in Goods and Services, and Commodities,
at http://www.unctad.org
58 ENTRI Menu of Treaty Texts Organized by Subject, at http://www.sedac.ciesin.org
54
55
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The most relevant environmental multilateral agreements, in terms of trade and
the environment, have addressed problems that revolve around discrete areas such as the
protection of the stratospheric ozone layer, conservation of endangered species, and
environmental harm from the trans-border shipment of hazardous waste. These treaties
include, but are not limited to: the Basel Convention, the Convention on Biological
Diversity, CITES, the Montreal Protocol, and the UN Framework Convention on Climate
Change.5 9 These treaties potentially affect trade through restrictions on trade,
requirements as to notification, or implementation of national laws that further the goals
of the treaties. The result is a complicated interrelation between the many various treaties,
organizations, and national environmental policies, which are in vital, need of
clarification and organization. Despite the attention in those areas, related areas in need
of more stringent environmental regulation include toxic chemicals and pesticides,
forests, oceans, water resources, air quality, energy resources and land use, urban and
industrial growth, to name a few. Treaties exist covering these topics, yet it is useful as an
illustration of how complex and interconnected international environmental law can be.
Dispute Resolution under MEA's
More than one-third of existing international environmental agreements contain
dispute settlement provisions. Examples include CITES, the Montreal Protocol, and the
Basel Convention. Despite the presence of dispute resolution provisions, they remain
largely inadequate or ineffective to date, mainly due to the lack of adequate means of
overarching enforcement. When compared to trade agreements, the dispute settlement
provisions in MEA's remain underdeveloped. This is due, in part, to the lack of history in
negotiating environmental agreements, as opposed to negotiating trade agreements. To
illustrate, some examples of these deficiencies must be brought to light.
The Montreal Protocol has served as an example of an excellent treaty, however is
lacking in some degrees, namely on the issue of the discipline of its parties as opposed to
non-parties. Montreal Protocol's dispute settlement provision, Article 8, and its
subsequent improvement in Copenhagen in 1992, still do not implement a stringent
system for dealing with disputes between the parties. 60 The agreed non-compliance
procedure establishes an Implementation Committee of ten Parties whose main task is to
seek "amicable" solutions to disputes. Everything is done via consensus. There are no
time limits established, and the committee must report to the Meeting of the Parties.
Punishments may include the issuance of "cautions" to the parties. There are many
exceptions in treaty obligations that are allowed mostly to developing nations that could
not be in compliance without such assistance, which may lead to disputes between the
parties. Examples include disputes about exemptions allowed to developing or least
59 See, supra note 13.
60

Keith H. Cristie, Stacking the Deck: Compliance and Dispute Settlement in International Environmental

Agreements, Economic and Trade Policy (CLE), Policy Staff Paper - NO. 93/15 (December, 1993).
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developed countries (LDC's), about cheating, or concerning parties who use their
consumption reduction targets to justify placing a higher burden on imports from other
parties." The party complained against can effectively block all progress by starting the
dispute resolution negotiation process, which is slow and involved. As such, the potential
for internal disputes is coupled with a lack of adequate means for resolution. Ultimately,
the arbitrating process has no teeth, nor does the conciliation commissions
recommendations, which only mandate that "the parties shall consider in good faith."
Parties may have their rights and privileges suspended, which is rare in practice, and are
not subject to the harsh trade restrictions placed on non-parties, pursuant to Article 4.
Alternatively, non-parties are presumed guilty and have their trade unilaterally
determined by the terms of the protocol. The inherent weakness of such mechanisms is
due to its lack of fairness to non-parties and the potential for abuse of enforcement
provisions amongst parties.
The Basel Convention does not subject parties to a definitive dispute settlement
process. The Basel Secretariat can prepare reports, which are critical of the breaching
parties' enforcement of the Convention's obligations. These reports are meant to increase
public pressure on the breaching party's government to mend its ways. 62 However, this
can be insufficient to enforce another country in breach. A party can attempt to settle the
matter through negotiation, and if this fails to submit the issue before the International
Court of Justice or to arbitration. Although the finding of an arbitration is purported to be
"final and binding" under Basel, there is no mechanism for ensuring that such a finding
will be implemented and enforced. Rather, the party complained against can frustrate
further action, while the complaining party is not authorized under the convention (or
GATT) to impose a sanction.
As in the Basel Convention, CITES Secretariat may report a breach publicly, after
an inquiry and making recommendations, in the hopes for public pressure for remedial
action. 63 Similarly, the parties may submit to arbitration by mutual consent. However, no
mechanism exists to ensure that the so-called "binding" arbitrating decision is followed.
Increased "Globalization" Reinforce
Cooperation

the Need

for Greater Environmental

In the realm of international environmental harm, the concept of environmental
sovereignty is moot. Damage in one area of the globe will, in some way, manifest itself
elsewhere to contribute to the overall environmental decay on a planetary scale. This has
been realized, as evident by the sectoral policy approaches taken by the US, EU, and
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other regional entities. However, regional entities alone are insufficient, and there is a
growing need for international cooperation on matters concerning the global commons.
Regional Environmental Policies
In addition to the conflict between the GATT/WTO regime and MEA's, there are
different trade and environment approaches taken by the GATT, NAFTA, the EU, and
the US. 64 The potential transferability of the lessons learned in each region must be
addressed under a global system. In isolation, the aforementioned merely present ways in
which to deal with a specific region's environmental problems. While that might work on
a small scale, it is clear that to address the substantial environmental problems being
faced, regulation of the global commons must be pursued.
In the search for more encompassing and affirmative environmental regulation,
NAFTA's treatment of other multilateral environmental agreements remains a promising
environmental beginning. 65 The NAFTA environmental side agreement has been
characterized by many as the "greenest trade agreement ever." It employs trade
measures, the potential inclusion of environmental expertise on dispute settlement panels,
investment disincentives to discourage the formation of "pollution havens" and the
emphasis to harmonize up, not down. 67 This side agreement included a more arduous
enforcement and dispute settlement provision, which provides for consultations between
parties, mediation, and arbitration if needed.68 In addition, it established the Commission
on Environmental Cooperation (CEC). 69 The CEC is adept at identifying and addressing
environmental problems, yet it seems unable to mitigate or prevent the environmental
effects of the parent trade agreement due to a series of legal and structural weaknesses.7 °
These include some procedural hurdles, namely, that the dispute resolution process is
relatively slow, as two-thirds of NAFTA parties must concur before the process can
continue. In addition, public participation has been said to be limited, which raises certain
skepticism among environmental groups and non-governmental organizations (NGO's).
Although NAFTA can be said to be a step in the right direction, the scope of such a
multilateral agreement must expand from covering the North American continent, to
covering the world. This carries its own attendant complexities.
European Union policy is based on environmental principles. Namely, it takes a
strong approach to trade and the environment, mandating that its member states uphold
64 Id.
65

Id.

66 Id.

Id.
68 Kevin W. Patton, Dispute Resolution Under the North American Commission on Environmental
67
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tough environmental policies, and incorporates the precautionary principle. 7' The
precautionary principle is defined as: "action to avoid the potential transboundary impact
of the release of hazardous substances shall not be postponed on the ground that scientific
research has not ftully proved a causal link between those substances, on the one hand,
and the potential transboundary impact, on the other hand. 7 2 In the 1990's, the EU
furthered environmental protection pursuant to its Fifth Community Action Programme
on the Environment (1992-2000), which emphasized the need for legislation to be
complemented with market-based instruments to change environmentally damaging
behavior.73 In addition, the Action Programme focuses on developing partnerships
between government, business, and the general public. A future concern, that mirrors
most sectorial and institutional entities at this point, is to strengthen the enforcement of
environmental legislation and to expand environmental regulation into all sectors of
government and legislation.
The US environmental foreign policy has more recently come to place a higher
importance on global environmental policy, however, it stops short of having as rigorous
or as binding principles, internally, as the EU. The State Department heads the effort to
meet the world's environmental challenges, and its initiative focuses on three basic
premises: (1) the future economy and the American people; (2) world political and
economic challenges; and (3) solutions resulting from partnerships with governments,
NGO's and businesses sharing a commitment to a healthier world.74 Regional
environmental hubs at embassies in Costa Rica, Uzbekistan, Ethiopia, Nepal, Jordan, and
Thailand have been put in place to further regional environmental policies that advance
our larger national interests. In addition, environmental cooperation has become an
important part of US relations with countries like Japan, India, Brazil, and China.
and Cooperation in Europe
Moreover, the US works with the Organization for Security
75
(OSCE) on current international environmental issues.
Environmental Sovereignty and Developing Nations
Among developing nations, there is an interest to maintain lower environmental
regulatory standards under a system of free trade. This is because the costs of meeting
environmental regulatory burdens are considerably lower and the resulting profit margin
7'Frequently
72
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73The EU and the Environment, at http://www.greeneurope.org/eu-env.htm
74 US State Department's First Annual Report on the Environment and Foreign Policy, Environmental
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at http://www.state.gov/www/global/oes/earth.html
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is larger. This "regulatory race to the bottom," where states are forced to relax domestic
environmental regulations is furthered in the hopes that businesses relocate and local
human capital is utilized.76 Many developing nations have come to regard lax
environmental standards as an unofficial comparative advantage. The true cost of gaining
such is borne by those whose quality of life the domestic-origin pollution adversely
affects." With the advent of the global commons concept, this sort of environmental
harm is identified as an external cost of production. Any theoretical comparative
advantage disappears when this cost of environmental degradation is attributed to the
market cost of the product. One problem, however, is due to the difficulty of
incorporating environmental harm into the market prices. 78 The theory goes that this
"environmental cost" or externality by nations upholding lax environmental regulations,
would receive greater international attention, thereby frustrating that nation's ability to
participate in free-trade, in part due to a lack of compliance with any of the multitude of
MEA's. In terms of corporations, a good corporation will often want to maintain
environmental standards higher than required because of external pressure from
ecolabeling systems, the financial community, or consumer groups. 79 Moreover, earlier
studies have failed to substantiate a "race to the bottom," as environmental expenditures
constitute a relatively small share of the overall investment cost of large firms. 80 As such,
the fear of a regulatory "race to the bottom" has been largely without merit.
Developing nations are in many cases, the most in need of fostering strong global
environmental policies, as they exist in areas prone to drought or in lower lying regions at
the mercy of an even minor rising of the sea-level. As such, it would be in their best
interest to comply. It goes without saying that international cooperation is needed and
developing nations collectively play a large part.
We are increasingly coming to understand that the whole of the earth's biosphere
is ecologically interconnected and that seemingly isolated damage to local environments
has complex and deleterious effects on the planet as a whole, although these effects are
not immediately known. 81 So-called domestic pollution, in actuality, contributes to
deterioration of the global commons. For example, emissions from an automobile
assembly plant in a less environmentally regulated country contributes to global warming
and air pollution and/or acid raid in neighboring countries. Local deforestation (of both
boreal and tropical rainforests) affects the global climate by reducing the amount of C02
sinks available to absorb greenhouse gasses (GHG's). A final example would be that of
an oil spill, which could have ecological effects on migratory marine life and on distant
76

77
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shores. Because the nature of environmental degradation enables it to transcend national
borders, it cannot be seen as an exclusively sovereign matter.8 2 Rather, environmental
harm is, for all intents and purposes, a global concern that extends beyond the power of
individual states to curtail.
Eco-labels
The European Union has been leading the way in furthering environmental
friendly labeling of products, otherwise known as eco-labels. The EU eco-label scheme is
one element of an overall strategy aimed at promoting environmentally friendly
production and consumption. Its objectives are (1) promote the design, production,
marketing and use of products that have a reduced environmental impact during their lifecycle; and (2) provide customers with better information on environmental impact of
products and to encourage preferential consideration of Eco-labeled products in
purchasing decisions. Such labels include those identifying biodegradable detergents,
recycled paper products, environmentally safe batteries, and dolphin-safe tuna. As criteria
for an increasing number of product groups are included under the EU Eco-label Scheme
and as consumers become more aware of it, we can expect to see a greater prevalence of
eco-label products. 83 Aside from the EU, national label schemes have been in existence
for some time, such as the German Blue Angel (20 years) and Nordic White Swan (13
years) schemes. Currently, these voluntary life-cycle management approaches primarily
cover the environmental costs associated with the disposal and recycling of goods, but
will increasingly pertain as standards imposed on the production of goods. 84
Ecolabels have the potential of becoming a win-win situation in the usually
conflicted arrangement of trade and the environment. The hopes are for an eventual shift
in consumer preference towards such environmentally friendly products. 85 If the demand
for environmentally friendly products increases, than the willingness of companies to
develop such items will also increase.86 Products using ecolabels include virtually every
major grouping, with the exception of the food, drink, and pharmaceutical groups.
However, work is in progress towards development of criteria for further product groups
including furniture, floor cleaning products, vehicle tires, and batteries. 87 Surveys
indicate that consumer interest in the environmental attributes of products is on the rise,
and that at least a segment of the population in some OECD countries is willing to pay a
82
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premium for environmentally sound products.8 8 Chapter IV of Agenda 21 acknowledges
the potential contribution that eco-labeling can make towards changes in unsustainable
consumption patterns.8 9 One problem-area is the potential of ecolabels to act as an
obstacle to trade. Future guidelines for the standardization of ecolabels would easily
remedy this. Thus, standardization would serve the win-win goals of non-interference
with trade (trade liberalization) while furthering beneficial environmental practice.
A more recent example in shifting consumer preference towards environmentally
friendly methods, is to use eco-labels to ameliorate the EU fishery crisis, where cod and
whiting in the North Sea and west of Scotland are in severe danger of collapse. 9° The
Forest Stewardship Council's (FSC) Forestry Certification Scheme is another means of
regulation, somewhat analogous to eco-labeling. Certification is based on a set of
internationally accepted principles of forest management that are environmentally sound,
socially just, and economically viable. 91 In the US, the "green-certification" movement is
taking hold amongst logging companies must prove that they are logging in an
environmentally conscious way. The logging companies may then place an eco-friendly"
label on their products. As a result of such eco-friendly labels, Seven Islands Land Co.,
has been expanding its sales more widely around the US and in Europe. 92 Seven Island's
president claimed that green certification has provided access to markets that wouldn't
otherwise exist for that company. Prominent among the backers of green-labeled products
are Altanta-based Home Depot, Inc., Briton's Sainsbury PLC supermarket giant, and
Sweden's huge Stora AB forest-products group.
International Harmonization of Environmental Policies
Global standard setting, either within the WTO or by linking such standards in
bilateral or multilateral environmental agreements to the WTO, will become of
paramount importance in the process of balancing interests relating to trade, and thus
market access, and the environment. The activities of one country have increasingly
caused negative effects in the environment of other countries by either transboundary
pollution, endangering the global environment (ozone depletion), or diminishing wildlife
and natural resources. Global harmonization of standards is now necessary to effectively
deal with such issues. While it is recognized that higher process standards are desirable,
88
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an argument stands that the harmonization of process standards, where the processes in
question have no trans-border or global environmental effects, is not needed. 93 As such,
the case for harmonization is the strongest when dealing with trans-border or global
pollution. The OECD has discussed a "harmonization agenda" identifying the most
urgent areas for action and the most practical means to help environmental and trade
policies converge. 94 Now, the focus is on increasing the international compatibility of
environmental policy instruments, - including ambient standards (set maximum
concentrations of pollutants in media like air, water, and soil), process and production
95
standards (PPMs), economic instruments (taxes or duties), and eco-labeling schemes.
There exists the possibility for harmonization of process and production standards
(PPMs), as opposed to other types of environmental policy instruments, yet the feasibility
of doing so remains elusive and complicated under the current regime. 96 Process
standards are government environment regulations on production methods, technologies,
and practices. 97 They include emissions and effluent standards, performance and design
standards, and practices prescribed for natural resource sectors. This difficulty is
perpetuated by the reality that many developing nations and businesses oppose
internationally harmonized PPMs mainly because compliance would impose additional
costs. Alternatively, since harmonization would reduce the non-tariff barriers posed by
testing and certification of products and the administration of standards, the private sector
seeks harmonization of product standards because it is more expensive for producers to
98
diversify products enough to meet the requirements of different importing countries.
hazardous waste,
Such PPMs could be used in areas such as clean air, clean water,
99
occupational health and safety, and national resource preservation.
One of the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) Technical
Committees- TC 207 on Environmental Management- is working on areas relevant to
sustainable development, producing "standards" in areas such as environmental
00
management systems (EMS), life-cycle assessment, and environmental labeling.
Global environmental management (EMS) refers to an integrated management structure
for proactive planning for the proper planning of all corporate environmental concerns or
impacts in the home and host countries.101 A salient example involves the standardization
of EMSs sought by ISO 14001 certification, the new voluntary international
See, supra note 88.
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at http://www.ciesin.org/docs
95 See, C. Stevens, supra note 78.
96 See, supra note
1.
97 See, C. Stevens, supra note 78.
98 Id.
99 See, Andrew L. Strauss, supra note 13.
1oo International Organization for Standardization, at http://www.iso.ch
101Candid Views of Fortune 500 Companies, US AEP, Global Environmental Management,
93
94

at http://www.usaep.org/gem/report.htm

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/jibl/vol1/iss1/4

18

Kula: The Advantages of Utilizing the WTO as a Global Forum for Environ

environmental systems standard for industry. The most common environmental
"requirements" relate to packaging, recycled paper, and ozone-depleting chemicals
(recycling or waste-management techniques).' 12 Although ISO 14001 represents neither
the leading edge nor the best practice in environmental management, there would be
significant incentives to encourage certification as a condition to unrestricted market
access (as a general market condition). 10 3 However, many global firms have EMSs in
place that are considered more advanced than ISO 14001 standardization.
A common fear of many environmentalists is that harmonization of product
standards (PPMs) may lead to lower levels of environmental protection via the "lowest
common denominator" effect.104 In other words, PPM standards may have to be lowered
across the boards to ensure international compliance and that this would act to lower the
higher environmental protection standards already observed by some developed nations.
Ecology, national sovereignty, and economics all are seen to play a role to reflecting the
different environmental policies and standards inherent from country to country. The
Uruguay Round Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement (TBT) recognized that no
country should be prevented from taking measures at the level it considers aypropriate,
including those, which are necessary for the protection of the environment.l 0 5 It follows
that convergence down to a relatively lower environmental product and process standards
could lower the overall degree of environmental protection. Moreover, the companies
producing an environmentally "superior" product could not reap the rewards of using
more environmentally sound practices, which generally involve additional costs to the
company. Yet in the long term, given the worsening state of the global environment,
discrimination against traded products on the basis of production method is inevitable.
This trend has been realized, to some degree, by major global firms. Leading
global firms are committed to voluntary environmental management or "greening the
supply chain" and sustainable industrial development.1 °6 For example, Japanese firms see
a strong philosophical link between corporate health and human, social, and
environmental health. It is popular for many large US firms to issue reports on their
performance under some of the voluntary initiatives of the US Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA). Government also can play a key role, in supporting efforts to green the
production chain. Leadership taken by groups of global firms can set private-sector
standards for foreign suppliers and result in win-win scenarios. Microsoft's
environmental innovations, moving from purchasing a packaged product or product with
manuals, etc. to licensing their products to be housed on a central server and downloaded,

102Id.
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benefit for Microsoft and a waste-stream benefit for their business
retain an economic
07
customers.1
It should be noted that aforementioned environmental standards are voluntary and
new. This presents problems with their enforcement, which are currently adhered to
because of the positive economic influences inherent in unrestricted market access. The
vast disparities among different nations economically and environmentally, are major
hurdles in the development of truly harmonized standards that also allow nations with
higher standards to maintain their current schemes.
WTO as an Effective Enforcement and Negotiation Forum
The WTO now serves as a central focal point in the trade arena with broad-gauge
rule making authority potentially covering the entire range of trade-related matters,
08
including environmental standards, among intellectual property, and agricultural areas.'
The inherent connection between many trade and environmental issues is inevitably
pushing the WTO into involvement with international environmental regulation. 10 9 The
agreement establishing the WTO refers to "optimal use of the world's resources in
accordance with the objective of sustainable development. The classic problem of
compelling international compliance centers on the lack of centralized adjudication and
enforcement mechanisms. Presently, the WTO provides the ideal global organizational
vehicle with the institutional capability to induce countries to participate in international
environmental agreements."l 0 Highly developed adjudicative and enforcement
mechanisms are distinguishing characteristics of the WTO. Additionally, all WTO
member countries are required to comply with the related agreements governed by the
organization. Integrating global environmental agreements into the framework of the
WTO would serve to ensure compliance in order to maintain the advantages of
membership.
The task of accomplishing greater environmental protection on a global scale
requires an institution with sufficient means to secure that goal. Although many
environmentalists are leery about the treatment of environmental concerns by the
WTO i l ', there is little doubt that it would provide an appropriate forum with broad
enough scope to effectuate more stringent global environmental regulations. The
argument for a parallel forum is delaying the inevitable issue in need of resolution,
namely, ameliorating the existent disparities between trade and the environment.
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Under the WTO structure, the emphasis would be on getting the regulatory areas
of trade and the environment to converge. Access to the benefits flowing from
participation as a member of the WTO trade regime, along with the possibility of revoked
privileges, could serve as a manner to enforce compliance with the already in place
Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU)." 2 This ability to control a WTO member
nation's market access would foster convergence between the areas of international trade
and international environmental regulations, which are seemingly at odds with each
other. Enforcement under the WTO could be used to impose the harmonization of
international PPMs. 113 This is not to say attendant difficulties are eliminated. On the
contrary, many complexities exist. However, the increasing awareness of the global
commons as an international effort and the unsettled conflict aims between trade and the
environment must be resolved to face such challenges. The history of international
environmental law has shown a strengthening of dispute resolution, as the world has
gotten smaller. As consumers and the general public inevitably become more
environmentally conscious, corporations continue to improve their environment
management systems, and developing nations will have more at stake than the relatively
minimal regulatory comparative advantage theory. It then becomes clear that provisions
must be made towards a more binding international scheme.
Securing Large-Scale Compliance
Utilization of the WTO as a forum for compliance and resolution of disputes
would offer advantages of its own. Reaching an agreement on effective globally
harmonized environmental standards is undoubtedly going to be an extremely difficult
task no matter what arena is chosen, and ultimately will depend upon the strength of the
environmental movement. 114 Including environmental negotiations as a part of WTO
comprehensive trade round, would at least help assuage such opposition to global
environmental production PPM standards and in the area of dispute resolution.
Larger scale compliance is feasible with the WTO. It is generally accepted that
developed countries regard the WTO as essential for international trade, however,
developing nations are increasingly coming to view participation in WTO multilateral
agreements as an economic necessity. 115 Future population and economic growth (along
with corresponding increases in environmental damage) will occur most dramatically in
developing countries. Acceptance of an international structure by developing nations is
essential to gain global cooperation and assistance. Broad-based participation by the
greatest possible number of developing nations is needed. Of the approximately 200
112
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countries in the world, about three-quarters are WTO members."16 Should environmental
concerns be aggregated with trade matters, such large-scale compliance could be used as
a method to enforce greater protection of the global commons.
Negotiation Platform for Environmental Standards (PPMs)
In terms of coming to an understanding on environmental PPM standards, the
WTO would prove to be an efficient forum for negotiation, as PPM requirements could
be implemented along parallel trade agreements."17 Coming to an agreement on
international PPM harmonization has its own complexities and difficulties to overcome.
Namely, some businesses oppose the standards because of the costs and developing
countries oppose the standards because they want to maintain their perceived
comparative advantage." l8 By linking harmonized PPM standards to trade pacts in future
WTO negotiating rounds, a new means of securing developing countries acceptance of
such standards would be available. Acceptance of international PPM standards would be
conditioned on access to international markets, as an incentive for compliance. As
developing nations will increasingly see membership in the WTO as a "necessity" for
economic well-being, the access to new and evolving markets becomes a strong reason to
comply with such WTO negotiations and mandates. Bringing PPM standards into
multilateral WTO negotiations would permit environmentalists to form strategic alliances
119
with industries that have stronger environmental management systems and policies.
This would ensure that their competitors do not enjoy a cost advantage from an overseas
location with more lax environmental standards. The leverage gained by coupling
environmental PPM requirements with trade would motivate corporations with antienvironmental agendas to reconsider any cost advantage vis-A-vis the potential loss of
market access.
Dispute Resolution
Under the WTO, the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) has become an
effective enforcement method in the sphere of international trade, and could be used to
enforce environmental measures were they incorporated into its framework. The WTO's
adjudicative mechanisms are established in several key provisions of the "Dispute
Settlement Understanding" that arose out of the Uruguay Round Agreements. 20 There
exists a coherent and regimented adjudication mechanism, consisting of clearly outlined
steps. Member nations seeking to resolve a dispute may engage in consultations, followed
116 Id.

Id.
18 Id.
17

119
120

See, supra note 101.
See, Andrew L. Strauss, supra note 13.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/jibl/vol1/iss1/4

22

Kula: The Advantages of Utilizing the WTO as a Global Forum for Environ

by the establishment of a panel to hear the issue, and appellate review if the decision of
the panel is not deemed adequate. 121 The final decision is automatic unless all members,
including the winning party, determine that it should not be adopted. 122 After the panel
report or appellate body report is adopted, the concerned party must notify the Dispute
Settlement Body (DSB) of its intentions with respect to implementation. 123 If it is
impossible to comply immediately, the concerned party is given a reasonable amount of
time for implementation.124 In the event of non-implementation, provisions of the DSU
set out the rules for compensation or the suspension of concessions to the violating
party. 125 The transparency of the WTO rules and the streamlined dispute resolution
system is, to date, more efficient and functional than that of its predecessor, the GATT.
Prior to the WTO, dispute resolution on the international scene was much slower and less
developed. Globalization has facilitated the need for improved resolution to handle the
increasing likelihood of disputes, as the world continually becomes a smaller place to
live.
In comparison to MEA's, the dispute resolution now present in the WTO regime
is quite effective by comparison. There is likely to be a continuing need to emphasize the
efficacy of environmental regulatory mechanisms, and also to reassert the connections
between international trade and the environment. In a bottom to top approach,
international environmental obligations require that affirmative governmental actions
address particular problems. By contrast, the overarching, centralized trade regime has
sought to eliminate governmental actions, such as tariffs. This difference in approaches
has been a cause of conflict in effectively regulating the concurrent interests in trade and
the environment. The weaknesses inherent in the mechanisms and institutions for
multilateral cooperation have been recognized by the WTO secretariat 1999 report.
The reason for WTO's ability to enforce is inherently due to the willingness to
maintain and partake in the international trading order. The Dispute Settlement
Understanding provides that if the party, adjudicated to be in violation of WTO rules,
does not remedy the situation or pay compensation to the winning party, trade
concessions can be withdrawn from the losing party.' 26 Rescission of such trade
concessions can be very costly to a nation. Therefore, such compliance with the dispute
resolution mechanisms is effectively voluntary. Such an incentive for compliance is a
very strong reason substantiating the WTO as an appropriate forum for gaining
compliance with environmental measures, should they be included under its framework.
Moreover, in addition to facing international pressures to comply, targeted domestic
121
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industries can assert their own internal pressure on government to comply.' 27 As this
applies for environmental treaty obligations, this could be a mechanism to mitigate any
regulatory overlap between WTO rules and MEA's.
Convergence of Trade and the Environment
A crucial issue is how both environmental and trade interests can work together to
ensure the ultimate compatibility of evolving MEA dispute resolution sanctions and those
of the GATT/WTO. In the activities of a variety of international institutions exploring the
trade-and-environment relationship, there is a genuine hope for the achievement of
balance. The fundamental finding of the WTO secretariat is that increased trade and
economic integration reinforce the need for greater environmental cooperation on global
and trans-border problems.' 28 The main reason for this is that economic integration
makes it harder for government to adopt optimal environmental policies, unilaterally.
"The globalization of the world economy may have reduced the regulatory autonomy of
countries, thereby making it more difficult to upgrade environmental standards unless as
a part of a concerted effort among nations."' 129 In terms of a solution, there is a need to
reinvent environmental institutions and to seek a new global architecture of
environmental cooperation, said the 1999 WTO report. 130 Such an "olive branch"
conjecture, on the part of the WTO secretariat, signifies a changing attitude regarding the
environment and the "greening" of international trade, so to speak. 3 ' Thus, the WTO
seems to be moving towards its originally stated incorporation of sustainable
development as an objective. Moreover, the secretariat opined that the WTO system,
based on legal rights and obligations, could potentially serve as a model for a more
structured environmental scheme to garner cooperation among nations. The secretariat
stops short of mentioning the methodology for obtaining such a solution.
The question between economic growth and environmental quality assume that
both must be balanced against each other. More often, it is becoming evident that the two
can be mutually reinforcing and consonant. "Sustainable trade" reflects the notion that
trade can facilitate the ability of present generations to meet their economic needs while
preserving the capacity of future generations to meet their own needs.132 If environmental
agreements are grouped in conjunction with trade negotiations, the overall benefits
gained from compliance with a trade deal could conceivable outweigh any contingent
costs of meeting environmental standards. Thus, businesses with anti-environmental
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agendas would be more inclined to accept such environmental policies than if
environmental agreements were not enforced by the economic benefits flowing from a
trade deal. 133 The 1999 WTO report found that the relationship between a nation's
increased economic growth and its level of environmental protection, which presupposes
that economic growth results in greater pollution, would be self-correcting.134 This
relationship between trade, economic growth, and the environment was studied via the
"Environmental Kuznets Curve" (EKC), which plots national income per capita against a
pollution indicator. It was found that some pollution rose at the early stages of
development but fell back after a certain income level was attained. Although generally
true, this relationship was not evident for all polluters. Second, overall economic growth
does not necessarily bring down pollution.135 Third, bringing down pollution requires
active intervention by governments, as greater democratic decision-making tends to
promote such intervention. 36 Per se economic growth does not reduce pollution. Rather,
pollution reduction requires increased income to be followed by tighter environmental
standards.
As eco-labeling is voluntary, as opposed to mandatory, and is one of the least
burdensome forms of regulation, the current debate is over whether this sort of
environmental regulation should be encouraged, rather than just tolerated by the
international trade regime. 137 Regulation involving ecolabeling would be more consistent
with the notion of "sustainable development" contained in the WTO agreement and it
does not hinder trade.
Obstacles to Implementation in the Current WTO Rules
Certain issues in WTO rules must be addressed before they can move forward as
an adequate forum for the global commons. The current environmental impact of WTO
rules can undermine environmental quality. For example, wasteful subsidies may
indirectly encourage over-fishing, intensive farming, and deforestation.' 3' The WTO
rules, which are in favor of trade liberalization, can potentially prevent environment or
health officials from using the needed regulations, taxes, or trade controls to further that
nation's environmental policies. Even uncertainty about WTO rules can lead to
"regulatory chill" as governments forego policies to avoid being involved in trade
disputes.' 39 The 1999 WTO Secretariat report opined that it would be possible to change
trade rules to give the WTO a more constructive role in promoting sustainable
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development. 140 In the interest of keeping environmental policies and trade constituents
contented, such a change is necessary for the WTO be an adequate forum.
Furthermore, the exclusionary membership policy of the WTO, preventing China and
Russia from joining the organization, must be addressed. Although China has recently
been admitted to the WTO, the US and EU had stymied its attempts to become a member
for some time. If the world trading system were to be beneficial for the environment, it
would follow that open membership in the WTO is needed.
Another problem with current GATT/WTO rules is that although they are
consistent with "polluter-pays" principles and cost internalization as domestic
environmental measures, the same standard should be implemented to enforce
international environmental policies.' 4 ' With such an affirmative requirement for cost
internalization contained in WTO instruments, the international trade regime could truly
promote sustainable trade and environmental protection simultaneously.
Alternative Forums
As motivation for working under the auspices of an international superstructure,
such as the WTO, the alternatives must be addressed. Unilateral actions could be pursued
under GATT article XX or through the use of retaliatory trade restrictions, such as US
§301.142 This approach would prove detrimental to the international trade order via the
creation of inappropriate barriers to trade and would fail to garner the global
environmental cooperation needed to address current problems. The isolationist
approach, furthered by Ralph Nader, 143 and unilateral enforcement of environmental
standards would merely be short term approaches that would cut against the sustainment
of long term international relationships that are inherently needed to prevent barriers to
trade consonant under an international trade scheme. This would ultimately not bode well
in terms of furthering global cooperation needed to address international environmental
concerns. For example, if each country took environmental enforcement into its own
hands, thereby excluding foreign products in violation, conflicting and incoherent
requirements for exporting goods would be the result. 144 Such a lack of transparency
would undermine the functioning of the international trade regime. The increased cost in
attempting to unilaterally assess environmental problems in countries around the world
would cause numerous problems in its enforcement. Moreover, the restricting of imports
in violation of local environmental regulations does not adequately address
environmental harms of a global nature.
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Previous alternative approaches to issues related to international trade have not
been as effective when compared to the WTO regime's approach. In the 1970's,
UNCTAD served as a means to rebalance the economic inequality between developed
and developing nations. 145 It was thought that UNCTAD was a far easier forum to meet
this objective. Not taking away the developments obtained by UNCTAD, the true
redistribution of wealth and means to further developing nation's prosperity occurred
separately, under GATT. 146 In dealing with the environment, the declarations of UNCED
at the Rio Conference and even many MEA's have been judged as little more than
"empty promises" due to their lack of efficacy.
Conclusion
The interrelationship between trade and the environment will continue to
converge at an increasing rate as the world continues to grow more interdependent. The
efficiency of the WTO as an overarching institution is the fruition of many decades of
trial and error, in the area of trade and negotiation between nations. The product of which
is inherent in the ability of the WTO to resolve disputes and serve as a forum for
negotiation. At this point in time, international environmental law is reaching amaturity
point where a more formal approach toward regulation is needed. Treaties and MEA's are
numerous and defragmented. The trend has been towards more binding enforcement
mechanisms, as environmental issues become generally recognized as imperative. Some
clash between issues involving trade and the environment has been inevitable, as trade is
motivated by economic gain, and environmental interests have the effect of curtailing
economic advantages in certain cases. The current system governing trade, under the
GATT/WTO regime, runs parallel to that monitoring environmental concerns rather than
concurrent with. While there are some fears of having an overarching system of
governance, such as the WTO, it is increasingly clear that trade and environment issues
must be addressed together.
I have attempted to illustrate the inherent advantages of utilizing the WTO as a
global forum for environmental regulation. Large-scale compliance could be secured, as
more developing nations are joining the WTO, and economic gains reinforce the
incentive to become a member. Having as many nations as possible involved would
reduce the "free rider" problem and ensure that adequate environmental practices are
being utilized. Moreover, the implementation of more binding rules and large-scale
compliance could inferably render trade and the environment to be mutually reinforcing
upon each other. Namely, the economic incentives contingent upon membership could
foster compliance with environmental regulation, if included under a WTO scheme. The
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real negotiations and battles would be fought in constructing the framework for such an
institutional governing scheme. An intangible shift towards the "greening" of commerce
could serve as some indication that a "workable compromise" between trade and the
environment could be on the horizon.
To be clear, I have only suggested certain examples of where problems lie in our
current scheme of environmental regulation, in addition to reasoning on how the WTO
could more efficiently address those deficiencies. The precise mechanisms for so doing
would involve much negotiation, effort, and substantive content than I could possibly
provide for in this note.
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